These quotes from Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer:
“To this day, I don’t know who finally pulled the plug on Able Danger-or why-but I do know that a lot of people were more concerned about their careers and getting that next promotion than they were about protecting their country. The army and SOCOM were ahead of their time in doing something about global terror. It was not a “failure of imagination” that resulted in the 9/11 attacks. It was pure bureaucratic bumbling and intellectual corruption.”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 176-7.
“General Vines knew the score, understood the intel and, in Patton-like style, wanted to take the war to the enemy-to show him no quarter. The Taliban was still there and was a threat to the long-term stability and economic programs that were just then taking root in Afghanistan. General Vines knew that he had to break the back of the counteroffensive before the Taliban could come back and take the country again.
“Leadership-the White House, Rumsfeld, top brass at the Pentagon-just didn’t get it. They were focused on Iraq. They weren’t listening. You could see that: Rumsfeld was showing up in Kabul every few months and declaring the combat was over. I had to believe that people were passing the right information up the chain. Whether he got it, I don’t know. His deputies sure didn’t get it. The Taliban didn’t recognize international borders. The Paks were in bed with the Taliban. The intelligence was irrefutable. Believing otherwise was a failure of leadership at the highest level.”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 182.
“Then Rumsfeld showed up in Kabul and appeared to be seriously delusional. He and Karzai claimed that the Taliban were no danger to the country.
“I’m not saying torture should never be used. I’d torture someone, if say, I believed that they had information that would prevent a nuclear weapon from going off or would likely prevent a massive loss of life. Albeit those kinds of situations are exceedingly rare. In fact, they usually only occur in the movies, not in real life. In the vast majority of cases, I don’t believe torture works-nor should it be used.”-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on teh Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 259.
“I eventually testified twice, both times in February 2006, to the House Armed Services Committee and the House Government Reform Committee in open and closed sessions. I concluded in my testimony that the Able Danger project might have prevented 9/11-and in closed (top secret) session, I outlined exactly my judgement in great detail based on the larger work, which is still unknown to the public.
“After multiple denials, DOD was eventually forced to confirm that Able Danger did exist, and to confirm that it was an offensive operation designed to identify and attack Al Qaeda in a preemptive manner, two years before the 9/11 attacks. General Hugh Shelton publicly confirmed the existence of the operation and that he had come up with the idea and tasked it to General Pete Shoomaker, then commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 274.
“To this day, I don’t know who finally pulled the plug on Able Danger-or why-but I do know that a lot of people were more concerned about their careers and getting that next promotion than they were about protecting their country. The army and SOCOM were ahead of their time in doing something about global terror. It was not a “failure of imagination” that resulted in the 9/11 attacks. It was pure bureaucratic bumbling and intellectual corruption.”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 176-7.
“General Vines knew the score, understood the intel and, in Patton-like style, wanted to take the war to the enemy-to show him no quarter. The Taliban was still there and was a threat to the long-term stability and economic programs that were just then taking root in Afghanistan. General Vines knew that he had to break the back of the counteroffensive before the Taliban could come back and take the country again.
”Privately, we assumed, he’d had to push back against Rumsfeld’s aggressive effort to turn activities in Afghanistan into a reconstruction-focused, postcombat, “permissive” environment, and to declare that the large-scale combat was over. After all, the focus of the main effort was Iraq. We wouldn’t want any bad news to tarnish the brilliant victory achieved in 2001 and 2002 in Afghanistan.”-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 176-7.
“Leadership-the White House, Rumsfeld, top brass at the Pentagon-just didn’t get it. They were focused on Iraq. They weren’t listening. You could see that: Rumsfeld was showing up in Kabul every few months and declaring the combat was over. I had to believe that people were passing the right information up the chain. Whether he got it, I don’t know. His deputies sure didn’t get it. The Taliban didn’t recognize international borders. The Paks were in bed with the Taliban. The intelligence was irrefutable. Believing otherwise was a failure of leadership at the highest level.”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 182.
“Then Rumsfeld showed up in Kabul and appeared to be seriously delusional. He and Karzai claimed that the Taliban were no danger to the country.
‘I’ve not seen any indication that the Taliban pose any military threat to the security of Afghanistan,’ Rumsfeld told reporters.”-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 257.
“I’m not saying torture should never be used. I’d torture someone, if say, I believed that they had information that would prevent a nuclear weapon from going off or would likely prevent a massive loss of life. Albeit those kinds of situations are exceedingly rare. In fact, they usually only occur in the movies, not in real life. In the vast majority of cases, I don’t believe torture works-nor should it be used.”-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on teh Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 259.
“I eventually testified twice, both times in February 2006, to the House Armed Services Committee and the House Government Reform Committee in open and closed sessions. I concluded in my testimony that the Able Danger project might have prevented 9/11-and in closed (top secret) session, I outlined exactly my judgement in great detail based on the larger work, which is still unknown to the public.
“After multiple denials, DOD was eventually forced to confirm that Able Danger did exist, and to confirm that it was an offensive operation designed to identify and attack Al Qaeda in a preemptive manner, two years before the 9/11 attacks. General Hugh Shelton publicly confirmed the existence of the operation and that he had come up with the idea and tasked it to General Pete Shoomaker, then commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).”
-Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and Special Ops on the Frontlines of Afghanistan-and the Path to Victory, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, St. Martin’s Press, 2010, pg. 274.
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